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NOTES
of acquiescence, the proposed code does not purport to change
the present law. 25 It is submitted, therefore, that the conclusion
reached in the Morgan City Co. case would remain unchanged.
The need to provide a possessor with an expeditious means
of clearing his title would seem to justify a limitation on the
slanderer's right to appeal devolutively from a judgment in
jactitation. This is recognized in the proposed new code.26 How-
ever, the possibility of a prohibitively high suspensive appeal
bond is reason enough for not denying the devolutive appeal
altogether. The Morgan City Co. decision appears to impose an
onerous condition on the right to a devolutive appeal. It is sub-
mitted that the alternative of the defendant in jactitation, to
bring either a devolutive appeal without a petitory action, or a
petitory action without a devolutive appeal, is not called for by
the jurisprudence or by the Code of Practice.
William S. Moss, Jr.
SALES - LITIGIOUS REDEMPTION - PARTIAL TRANSFER
Plaintiff brought suit for breach of a contract to drill an oil
well on his property. After trial on the merits in the district
court, plaintiff died. Judgment was rendered in behalf of the
administrator and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Subsequent to judgment in the district court, the four heirs of
decedent were put into possession of the estate and were substi-
tuted for the administrator as parties plaintiff. Pending the
appeal two of the plaintiffs sold their interests in the litigation
to a third party who was substituted for them as party plaintiff.
Shortly after learning of the transfer defendant filed a motion to
remand to the district court in order to institute proceedings for
be taken from such judgment only within thirty days of the applicable date pro-
vided in Article 2087(1)-(3)."
Note that the final paragraph of Article 3662 will effect an important change,
in that the period allowed for bringing the devolutive appeal will be limited to
thirty days. This is only fifteen days longer than allowed for the bringing of a
suspensive appeal and serves to minimize the opportunity of the defendant to
employ dilatory tactics.
25. Id. art. 2085: "An appeal cannot be taken by a party who confessed judg-
ment in the proceedings in the trial court or who voluntarily and unconditionally
acquiesced in a judgment rendered against him. Confession of or acquiescence in.
a part of a divisible judgment or in a favorable part of an indivisible judgment
does not preclude an appeal as to other parts of such judgment."
26. The last paragraph of Article 3662 of the Proposed Code of Civil Procedure
provides for a devolutive appeal, but only if taken within thirty days of.,the ap-
plicable date. See note 24 supra. :.
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the purpose of litigious redemption under the provisions of Ar-
ticle 2652 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The two heirs who had
not sold their interests opposed this motion, urging that a re-
mand would be inequitable because they would lose their position
on the preference docket, thereby delaying disposition of the
action. On the motion to remand, held, remanded, to be returned
within sixty days to its present position on the preference docket.
The right granted by Article 2652 is absolute even in the case of
a partial transfer. Clement v. Sneed Brothers, 116 So.2d 269
(La. 1959).
Article 2652 of the Civil Code provides that a party against
whom a litigious right has been transferred may be released by
paying to the transferee the real price of the transfer together
with interest from the date thereof.' A litigious right is defined
as one being contested in litigation. 2 The Code provides for three
exceptions to the application of litigious redemption: (1) when
the transfer has been made to either a coheir or to the copro-
prietor of the right, (2) when the transfer has been made as a
dation en paiement to a creditor of a debt due, and (3) when
the transfer has been made to the possessor of the estate subject
to the litigious right.3 Thus far the doctrine has been applied
only to sales, 4 perhaps in view of the express reference to "price"
in Article 2652. At the trial court level, litigious redemption
proceedings are instituted by a request that evidence of the price
of the transfer be received by the court.5 After the determina-
tion of the price, the redemptor may tender it, thereby effecting
his release. At the appellate level, proceedings are instituted by
a motion to remand.6 The exercise of the privilege afforded by
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2652 (1870) : "He against whom a litigious right has
been transferred, may get himself released by paying to the transferee the real
price of the transfer, together with the interest from its date."
2. Id. art. 2653: "A right is said to be litigious, whenever there exists a suit
and contestation on the same." A conflicting definition of a litigious right is
found in id. art. 3556(18) : "Litigious rights are those which cannot be exercised
without undergoing a lawsuit." The Supreme Court has resolved the obvious con-
flict between these two definitions by ignoring the latter. For a discussion of the
conflicting code provisions, see Comment, 1 LouisIANA LAW REVIEW 593, 595
(1939).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2654 (1870).
4. Comment, 1 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 818, 820 (1939). The author points
out that though the article has never been applied to exchange in Louisiana, there
is some support for the view that it would be so applied, if the question were to
reach the court. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2667 (1870) : "All the other provisions
relative to the contract of sale apply to the contract of exchange. And in this
last contract each of the parties is individually considered both as a vendor and
vendee."
5. Marshall v. McCrea, 2 La. Ann. 79 (1847); Lavigne v. Louisiana Ry. &
Navigation Co., 12 La. App. 275, 124 So. 609 (1929).
6. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 906 (1870) provides: "But if the court shall
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Article 2652 must be timely, that is, the party against whom the
right has been transferred must institute the proceedings within
a reasonable time after learning of the transfer and during the
existence of the suit.7 Having learned of the litigious transfer,
the redemptor may not continue to contest the cause until final
judgment or loss of the suit is imminent.8
A special problem is presented where only a partial transfer
of the litigious right is made. If, as suggested in some of the
earlier cases, a reason underlying the redemption rule is to pre-
vent protraction of litigation,9 it can be seen that in this situa-
tion, there exists a possibility of prolonging litigation in order
to exercise the privilege. In Smith v. Cook1 ° the Supreme Court
for the first time was faced with a situation wherein a partial
transfer of a litigious right was made. On the first hearing the
court denied the prospective redemptor's motion to remand to
the district court for redemption proceedings, reasoning that the
purpose of the rule was to end litigation and that the exercise of
redemption would not effect that purpose. However, on rehear-
think it not possible to pronounce definitively on the cause, in the state in which
it is, either because the parties have failed to adduce the necessary testimony, or
because the inferior court refuses to receive it, or otherwise, it may, according to
circumstances, remand the cause to the lower court, with instructions as to the
testimony which it shall receive, to the end that it may decide according to law."
See also Lee v. Perkins, 195 La. 939, 197 So. 607 (1940) ; Sterkx v. Sterkx, 193
La. 409, 190 So. 628 (1939) ; Smith v. Cook, 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1937) ;
Langston v. Shaw, 147 La. 644, 85 So. 624 (1920) ; Bluefields S.S. Co. v. Lala
Ferreras Cangelosi S.S. Co., 133 La. 424, 63 So. 96 (1913) ; Comment, 1 Louisi-
ANA LAW REviEW 818, 829 (1939).
7. Crain v. Waldron, 210 La. 561, 27 So.2d 333 (1946) ; Evans v. De L'Isle,
24 La. Ann. 248 (1873) ; Rhodes v. Hooper, 6 La. Ann. 355 (1851) ; Pearson v.
Grice, 6 La. Ann. 232 (1851) ; Leftwich v. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 104 (1849) ; Mar-
shall v. McCrea, 2 La. Ann. 79 (1847); Winchester v. Cain, 1 Rob. 421 (La.
1842) ; Lerner Shops of Louisiana v. Reeves, 73 So.2d 490 (La. App. 1954);
Cucullu v. Hernandez, 103 U.S. 105 (1880) ; Mohawk Oil Co. v. Layne, 270 Fed.
851 (5th Cir. 1921).
8. Mohawk Oil Co. v. Layne, 270 Fed. 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1881), wherein the
court said: "Just how far short of final judgment one may go before seeking to
avail himself of the provisions of the article depends largely upon the facts of
each case."
9. Leftwich v. Brown, 4 La. Ann. 104 (1849) : "The laws . ..on which the
articles of our Code concerning litigious rights are founded, have no other object
than the prevention of unnecessary litigation, which is attained in a great measure
by the check they impose on the cupidity of speculators in lawsuits. They enable
the defendant to take the place of the purchaser of the suit against him, by paying
the price he has paid for it, with interest. Thereby the litigation is ended, and
the object of the law attained. But, if as the defendant has done in this case, he
continues to contest the suit, raises difficulties as to the right of the plaintiff to
recover his debt and protracts the litigation, he evidently defeats the very object
of the law, and cannot avail himself of the provision which the law has estab-
lished in his favor for the purpose of terminating litigation. To permit him to do
it, would be to defeat the very object of the law." Of. Salbadore v. Crescent Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 22 La. Ann. 338 (1870) ; Lerner Shops of Louisiana v. Reeves, 73
So.2d 490 (La. App. 1954).
10. 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1937).
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ing," the court reversed its position stating that it is not neces-
sary that the suit be brought to an end by the redemption and
noting that litigation would end with respect to that particular
interest which had been transferred. 12
In the instant case, the court was faced with a situation
which clearly fell within th6 ambit of the rule of Smith v. Cook.
The situation was identical but for the fact that not all of the
parties were involved in litigious transfers, two of them having
retained their full interest in the litigation. The defendant asked
that the case be remanded to hear testimony on the real price of
the transfer. It was argued that if this procedure were followed
the two parties plaintiff who had retained their full interests in
the litigation would lose their position on the preference docket
of the court and that the procedure would delay the final de-
termination of the cause. 13 The court, in the instant case, was
able to dispose of the motion without adversely affecting either
the prospective redemptor or the parties plaintiff. While stating
that defendant's motion to remand could not be denied, the court
allowed the appeal to retain its position on the preference docket.
In conclusion, it is submitted that by taking cognizance of
the possible adverse effects to the plaintiff's position on the pref-
erence docket and its decision to alleviate in part this adversity,
the court disposed of the situation in a most equitable manner.
It would seem that by its strong language14 the court indicated
that the privilege granted the redemptor by Article 2652 is abso-
lute, and will be extended to all partial transfers of litigious
rights.
Jerry W. Millican
11. Id. at 493: "We are therefore of the opinion that the defendant in the
instant case has the right to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code and upon
his complying with the requirements thereof, will have settled his rights to the
property in controversy to the extent of the several transfers made."
12. Smith v. Cook, 189 La. 632, 180 So. 469 (1937). The rule of litigious re-
demption had its written beginning in the early part of the 6th century A.D., and
was designed 'by the Emperor Anastasius to prevent the avaricious practices usual-
lycarried on by litigious vendees. The law was incorporated into the Code Justin-
iai and later became part of the French law. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE,
AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE no. 1650
(1959) casts doubt on the validity of the rule when he says (in respect to the pre-
vention of avaricious practices), "the weight of such argument is today question-
able - historically there has never been any other."
13. Clement v. Sneed Brothers, 116 So.2d 269, 272 (La. 1959) : "[We cannot
. . . hear the case in this Court until defendants are able to determine whether
they will redeem the litigious right purchased."
14. Id. at 272: "While we cannot deny defendant's legal right to a remand
or hear the case in this Court until defendants are able to determine whether they
will redeem the litigious right purchased .... " (Emphasis added.)
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